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"I  can  only  agree  with  the  Court  of Appeals  which  viewed  the
city's action  as nothing more  than 'one  more  of the many humilia-
tions  which  society  has  historically  visited'  on  Negro  citizens."
-Justice  Thurgood Marshall
I.  INTRODUCTION
Two  customers  enter a  retail clothing  store.  One  customer,  who  hap-
pens  to be  white,  is  left alone  to browse  for a  while,  then,  is  politely  of-
fered assistance  by  the  sales  staff and  treated  courteously  as  she  tries  on
clothes.  She brings  a sweater  to  the  check-out  counter  where  the  cashier
helps her,  smiles  at her,  and  wishes  her a  good  day.  A  second customer,
who happens to be African-American,  has an entirely different experience.
From  the  moment  he  walks  in  the  store,  store  employees  follow  him
around,  hovering over him and pointedly  failing to offer  assistance.  When
he  goes  to try on clothes,  two sales  clerks  stand guard  outside the  chang-
ing  room.  When  he  brings  the  clothes  to  the  checkout  counter,  he  is
treated  to  racially  derogatory  remarks  and  accosted  with  obscenities.  Al-
though  this  treatment  is  insulting  and  upsetting,  it  does  not  prevent  him
from actually purchasing the items.  Does federal law prohibit such racially
discriminatory  treatment?
*  o 2011  Joseph William  Singer.  Bussey  Professor  of Law,  Harvard  Law  School.  Thanks  and
affection go to Martha Minow & Mira Singer.
1.  City  of  Memphis  v.  Green,  451  U.S.  100,  147  (1981)  (Marshall,  J.,  dissenting),  quoting
Judge Engel's  majority opinion in Green v.  City of Memphis,  610 F.2d 395,  404 (6th Cir.  1979),  that
was overturned  in City of Memphis v. Green.
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You  might think,  in  the  year  2010,  that the  answer  to  this  question
would  be  a  solid yes.  But  you  would  be  mistaken.  Some  courts  do  hold
that federal law  prohibits racially  discriminatory  treatment of customers  in
retail  stores,  but  most  do  not.  And  this  failure  to  protect  persons  from
racially  discriminatory  treatment  is  not  limited to  the  area  of public  ac-
commodations.  Although  the federal  Fair  Housing Act  (FHA)2  has  prohi-
bited  racial  discrimination  in  the  sale  of rental  or  housing  since  1968,
some  courts  have recently  held that the  FHA  does  not protect  condomi-
nium  owners  or  residential  tenants  from  discriminatory  harassment  by
neighbors.  Although the  Seventh  Circuit  has  recently  ruled that the  FHA
does prohibit such conduct  in at least some  cases,  there  is no judicial con-
sensus  on  the  question  of whether  federal  law  prohibits  post-acquisition
racially  motivated  harassment  of  owners  or  renters  of  real  property  by
neighbors.
This  is a  shocking and  demoralizing  situation.  Most people  would be
surprised to find out that stores are legally entitled to treat customers diffe-
rently  because  of their  race.  Most  people  would  not  imagine  that  they
could  harass  their  neighbors  because  of their  race.  Federal law,  as  inter-
preted by  many  federal judges,  seems  out  of line  with  ordinary  expecta-
tions.3  What accounts  for this?
One answer is that federal judges have  an overly narrow conception  of
statutory  interpretation.  I  will argue that  this  is  indeed  a part of the  prob-
lem.  But  a  second  answer relates  to  deeper  concerns.  These judges  have
not only shown a deep failure  of empathy but have based their rulings on a
flawed  model of the concept and institution  of property,  as well as flawed
models  of equality  and  liberty.  They  are  legitimately  worried  about intru-
sive government regulation of business,  but they wrongly  fail to give equal
weight to the  crucial task of enforcing  the minimum  standards  for market
relationships  appropriate  to  a  free and  democratic  society  that treats  each
person with  equal  concern and  respect.  Contrary  to  the  view that federal
regulations  are  inherently  coercive  interferences  with  individual  liberties
and  thus  should  be  interpreted  narrowly  even  when  they  concern  racial
discrimination,  I  will  argue  that American  property  and  contract  law  are
defined  by baseline  principles  that outlaw  market relationships  associated
with racial caste.
United  States  law  does  and  should  recognize  a  foundational  anti-
apartheid  principle  that puts  out  of bounds  market  conduct  that deprives
individuals  of equal  opportunities  because  of their  race.  The  civil  rights
movement  and  civil rights laws have altered the foundational  principles  of
2.  42 U.S.C.  §§  3601-3619,  3631  (2010).
3.  It is possible,  of course,  that  I am wrong  about this  and that racially discriminatory  treatment
of African  Americans  in  the  marketplace  is  thought  by  some  to  be justified.  See,  e.g.,  Walter  E.
Williams,  The Intelligent Bayesian, THE NEW REPUBLIC,  Nov.  10,  1986,  at  18.
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contract  and  property  law  on which  our  market  system  is  based.  Before
1964,  racial  discrimination  was  not  only  common  in  many  states  but  ac-
tually mandated  by  law.  After passage  of the  public accommodations  law
in  1964,  our conception  of the obligations  of businesses  open to the public
changed  and  with  it the  meaning  of the  right to  contract  and  to  purchase
property.  Those  who  operate  public  accommodations  take  on the  obliga-
tion to  serve  the public without  invidious discrimination.  Patrons have  the
right  to  enter  public  accommodations  on equal  terms.  Although  we  have
rights to choose our friends on whatever basis  we like,  we do not have the
right to choose our customers  on the basis of race;  nor are we  free to treat
some  customers  worse  than  others  for  racially  discriminatory  reasons.
Civil rights statutes  should,  therefore,  be  read with this  baseline  principle
in line.
II. DISCRIMINATORY  HARASSMENT  IN PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
Does federal  law  prohibit racially  discriminatory  treatment of patrons
of public  accommodations?  The  answer  is  surprising.  Federal  law  prohi-
bits  discrimination  in public  accommodations,  but the protection  it grants
to customers  of retail stores is  surprisingly weak.4  The Civil Rights Act of
1964  prohibits  discrimination  in  "place[s]  of public  accommodation"  and
also  guarantees  "full  and  equal  enjoyment  of the  goods,  services,  facili-
ties,  privileges,  advantages,  and  accommodations"  of those places.'  How-
ever,  the  1964  statute has a narrow  definition  of what constitutes  a public
accommodation,  covering  only  inns,  restaurants,  places  of entertainment,
and gas stations.6  Although one might read the list in the  statute to be illu-
strative rather than exhaustive,  it is generally  assumed that the act does not
extend  to unlisted places,  such as retail stores.'
The  Civil Rights  Act of 1866  may constitute  an alternative  source for
protecting  people  from  discrimination  in  access  to  retail  stores.  Section
1981  grants  all persons  equal  rights to  contract and  § 1982  grants  all citi-
zens equal rights to acquire property.  Those  sections now read as follows:
§ 1981.  Equal Rights Under the Laws
(a) Statement of equal rights. All  persons within the jurisdiction of
the  United States  shall have the  same right in every  State and Ter-
ritory  to make  and  enforce  contracts,  to  sue,  be parties,  give  evi-
4.  Joseph  William  Singer,  No Right to  Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Propeny,
90  Nw.  U.  L.  REV.  1283 (1996).
5.  42 U.S.C.  § 2000a(a) (2010).
6.  42 U.S.C.  § 2000a(b) (2010).
7.  Denny  v.  Elizabeth Arden Salons,  Inc.,  456 F.3d 427  (4th Cir.  2006)  (finding  the  list to be
exhaustive).
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dence,  and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons  and property  as  is enjoyed by white cit-
izens,  and  shall  be  subject  to  like  punishment,  pains,  penalties,
taxes,  licenses,  and exactions  of every kind, and to no other.  8
(b)  "Make and enforce contracts" defined. For  purposes  of this
section,  the term  "make  and  enforce contracts"  includes  the mak-
ing,  performance,  modification,  and  termination of contracts,  and
the enjoyment  of all  benefits,  privileges,  terms,  and  conditions  of
the contractual relationship.  9
(c)  Protection against impairment. The  rights  protected  by  this
section  are  protected against impairment  by nongovernmental  dis-
crimination and impairment under color of State law.  o
§ 1982 Property Rights of Citizens
All  citizens  of the United  States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory,  as  is enjoyed by white citizens  thereof to inhe-
rit, purchase,  lease,  sell,  hold and  convey real  and personal  prop-
erty.11
At first glance,  the statutes  appear to provide  capacious  rights to  enter
the marketplace  free from invidious  racial  discrimination.  Indeed,  all fed-
eral courts  that have considered the  issue have  found that these  statutes  at
least require  stores  open to the public  to let patrons  into the  store  without
regard  to  race.12  These  rulings  are  based  on  the  case  of  Runyon  v.
McCrary 1 3, which  held that § 1981  prohibits commercially  operated,  non-
religious  schools  from excluding  qualified  children  solely  on the basis  of
race.  However,  the court rulings are  surprisingly mixed on the question  of
whether  the  Civil  Rights  Act  of 1866  prohibits  discriminatory  treatment
once  one  gets  inside  the  store.  Do  these  statutes,  for  example,  prohibit
racially discriminatory  surveillance of store customers?
A  minority  of courts  hold  that such conduct  does  violate  the  right to
contract  under  § 1981,  the  right  to  purchase  personal  property  under
§ 1982,  or both.14  In Phillip v.  University of Rochester,"  for example,  the
8.  42 U.S.C.  §  1981(a)  (2010).
9.  42 U.S.C.  §  1981(b)  (2010).
10.  42 U.S.C.  §  1981(c)  (2010).
11.  42 U.S.C.  §  1982  (2010).
12.  See,  e.g.,  Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores,  Inc.,  252 F.3d 862  (6th Cir. 2001);  Ackaa v. Tommy
Hilfiger Co.,  No.  96-8262,  1998  WL  136522 (E.D.  Pa. Mar.  24,  1998).
13.  427 U.S.  160  (1976).
14.  Chapman v.  Higbee Co.,  319 F.3d  825 (6th Cir.  2003)  (equal benefits  clause in § 1981  gives
right to  equal treatment  in  seeking  a contract);  Phillip v.  Univ. of Rochester,  316  F.3d 291  (2d  Cir.
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Ninth Circuit held that  § 1981  applied to a private university whose  securi-
ty guards detained  African American students but not their white friends in
the  library  lobby and  called  the police,  who  arrested them  and kept them
detained  overnight.  The  court  found  that  the  "full  and  equal  benefits"
clause  in  § 1981(a),  when  combined  with  § 1981(c)'s  extension  of  the
right  to  private  relationships,  sufficed  to  grant  the  plaintiffs  a  remedy  if
they could prove that they were  treated differently  because  of their  race.16
Similarly,  a  federal  court  in  Illinois  applied  the  equal  benefits  clause  in
§ 1981  to  allow  a claim to be brought by an African American family  who
were  denied utensils and harassed and threatened while at a restaurant. 17
However,  most courts  have  interpreted  the  "right to  make  contracts"
extremely  narrowly,  holding that this right is denied only when a patron is
"actually  prevented,  and  not merely  deterred,  from making  a purchase  or
receiv[ing]  service  after attempting  to  do so.""  These courts  have  denied
relief  when  a  patron  was  treated  disrespectfully  or  refused  assistance;19
subjected to discriminatory  surveillance,  searches,  or detention;  removed
from  a  store  for discriminatory  reasons  after  making  a purchase; 2 1  or put
under  surveillance  and  accused  of shoplifting  after  purchasing  items  and
leaving  the  store.22  The Fifth Circuit, for example,  in Arguello v.  Conoco,
Inc.,  found no remedy when a clerk shouted obscenities  and  made racially
derogatory  remarks  directed  at a Latina  customer  after she completed  her
purchase  at  a  gas  station.
23  The  remarks  frustrated  not  only  her but her
father,  who  decided not to complete his purchase  of beer in the  store por-
tion of the gas station.24
2003)  (equal  benefits  clause  of § 1981  applies  in private  university  whose  security  guards  detained
African  American  students  but  not  their  white  friends  in library  lobby,  calling  police  who  arrested
them  and kept  them detained  overnight);  McCaleb v.  Pizza  Hut of Am.,  Inc.,  28  F.  Supp.  2d  1043
(N.D.  Ill  1998)  (family  denied  "full benefits"  of the  contract  when  denied utensils  and harassed  and
threatened  while at restaurant);  Nwakpuda  v. Falley's,  Inc.,  14  F.  Supp.  2d  1213  (D.  Kan.  1998)  (§
1981  claim for store patron who was wrongfully detained  because he  was thought to be individual who
had previously  robbed the  store); Turner v. Wong,  832 A.2d 340  (N.J.  Super.  Ct. App.  Div. 2003).
15.  316  F.3d 291  (2d Cir. 2003).
16.  Id. at 297-98.
17.  McCaleb v. Pizza Hut of Am.,  Inc.,  28 F.Supp.  2d 1043(N.D.  Ill.  1998).
18.  Ackerman  v.  Food-4-Less,  No.  98-CV-1011,  1998  WL  316084,  at  *4  (E.D.  Pa.  June  10,
1998)  quoting Henderson  v. Jewel Food Stores,  Inc.,  No.  96-C-3666,  1996  WL 617165,  at *3 (N.D.
Ill.  Oct. 23,  1996).  Accord, Hampton v. Dillard Dep't Stores,  Inc.,  247 F.3d 1091  (10th Cir.  2001).
19.  Arguello v.  Conoco,  Inc.,  330 F.3d  355 (5th Cir.  2003)  (no  § 1981  claim when clerk shouted
obscenities  and  made  racially  derogatory  remarks  at  Latino  customer  after  she  completed her  pur-
chase);  Wesley v. Don Stein Buick,  Inc.,  42  F. Supp.  2d 1192 (D.  Kan.  1999).
20.  Gregory  v.  Dillard's,  Inc.,  565  F.3d  464  (8th  Cir.  2009)  (no  § 1981  violation  when  store
employees  follow African  Americans  around the  store and  stand  guard outside  changing  rooms  when
such customers try on clothes);  Morris v. Office  Max,  Inc.,  89 F.3d 411  (7th Cir.  1996).
21.  Flowers  v.  TJX Cos.,  No.  91-CV-1339,  1994 WL 382515  (N.D.N.Y.  July  15,  1994).
22.  Garrett  v. Tandy Corp.,  295 F.3d 94 (1st  Cir. 2002).
23.  330  F.3d 355 (5th Cir.  2003).
24.  Id. at 357.
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The  courts  that find  no violation  of the  Civil Rights  Acts  when  cus-
tomers  are treated unequally on the premises  because  of race have  done so
because  they  have  an  inappropriately  narrow  conception  of the  "right to
contract,"  as  well as  an  inappropriate approach  to statutory  interpretation.
Judge Jerry  E.  Smith's opinion  for the Fifth Circuit's decision  in Argeullo
argues,  for example,  that "[s]ection  1981  does not provide a general  cause
of action for race  discrimination.""  Rather,  to  show  a denial of a right to
contract,  the  claimant  must  "demonstrate  'the  loss of an  actual,  not  spe-
culative  or prospective,  contract interest"'  by offering  evidence  of "'some
tangible  attempt  to  contract'  that in  some  way  was  'thwarted'  by  the  de-
fendant. "26  This  suggests  that  contracts  take  place  at  the  magic  moment
when the customer offers money for goods or services,  and the store either
accepts  or  does not  accept.  Contract,  in  this  view,  does  not  include  the
treatment that occurs while one is on the  store premises but before one has
purchased  items;  nor does  it  include treatment  one  receives  after  one has
purchased an item.27
This  conclusion  is  not only  unwarranted,  but it is  also  absurd.  First,
the courts  seem united in the conclusion that § 1981  at least requires  stores
to  allow patrons  to  cross  the  threshold  of their  stores.  One would  indeed
be denied  the right to  contract if one  were  not allowed to  enter the  store.
But, if that is  so,  then it is peculiar indeed  to find that § 1981  regulates the
moment  of entrance  and  the  moment  of attempted  purchase,  but nothing
that happens  in between.  This defies  common  sense.  Contracts  do not oc-
cur  magically  at  discrete  moments  in  time.  To  find  the  right  shirt or to
order  the  desired  food  in the  restaurant,  patrons  depend  on  the  services
provided by store personnel  and wait staff.  The treatment  of customers  in
the course of looking for goods  to buy  is  a  necessary part of the  contract-
ing process.
Second,  to find  a violation  of the right to  contract only  when one has
been "thwarted""  in making a purchase grants  remedies only to those who
refuse  to  stand  for disgraceful  treatment  while denying  remedies  to  those
willing  to  go  through  with  a  deal.  This  suggests  that if one  is  stalwart
enough to  ignore racial  insults  and  surveillance  or desirous  enough  of the
product one is attempting to purchase  that one has  no right to complain  of
discriminatory  treatment  along the way.  But  it is  not at all clear  why this
should  be  so.  Why  provide  a  remedy  only  for those  who  are  either  too
proud or too sensitive  to racial taunts to  complete the deal while denying a
25.  Id. at 358.
26.  Id.,  citing Morris  v.  Dillard Dep't  Stores,  Inc.,  277 F.3d  743,  751-52  (5th Cir.  2001);  Bel-
lows v. Amoco Oil Co.,  118  F.3d 268,  275 (5th Cir.  1997).
27.  For  a  full  canvass of the  cases  in this  area  and a  cogent analysis,  see  Charlotte  H.  Sanders,
Come  Down and Make  Bargains  in Good Faith: The Application of 42  U.S. C.  §  1981  to Race and
National Origin  Discrimination  in Retail Stores, 4 HASTINGS  RACE & POVERTY L. J. 281  (2007).
28.  Arguello, 330 F.3d at 358 (internal  citation omitted).
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remedy  to those who  insist on asserting their rights by going  through with
it and demanding  service?
Third,  denial of rights to  those who  suffer  discriminatory  harassment
while  in  a public  accommodation  ignores both the  statutory  language  and
the  legislative  history  of  § 1981.  Although  at  one  time  it  was  unclear
whether  § 1981  applied  to private  discriminatory  conduct,  that issue  was
laid  to  rest  in  1972  when  the  Supreme  Court  ruled,  in  Runyon  v.
McCrary,
29  that  § 1981  applied  to  private  conduct.  It is  true  that the  Su-
preme Court issued an ungenerous interpretation of the language of § 1981
in the  1989  case  of Patterson v.  McLean  Credit Union, 30  when  it  found
that  § 1981  required  employers  to hire  employees  without  regard  to  their
race but provided no remedies if employees were discriminatorily  harassed
on  the  job.  But  that  decision  was  specifically overturned by  the  Civil
Rights  Act of 1991.31  To understand  current  law,  we  must revisit the rea-
soning of Patterson  to  see what Congress  sought  to change when  it passed
the amendatory  1991 statute.
In the majority  opinion in Patterson, Justice  Kennedy  began by  inter-
preting  § 1981  narrowly:  "Section  1981  cannot be construed  as  a general
proscription of racial  discrimination in all aspects of contract relations,  for
it expressly  prohibits  discrimination  only  in  the making  and  enforcement
of contract."3 2  One  might  have  thought  that  the  language  "making  and
enforcement"  would  encompass  all  aspects  of the  contracting  process  ra-
ther than a limited  intervention.  Why,  for example,  would the Congress  in
1866  think  it  appropriate  to  regulate  contract  making  but  not  treatment
during the contractual  relationship?  That would prevent parties  from mak-
ing a contract of slavery but would  not prevent  an employer from treating
a worker like a  slave while on the job.
Kennedy explained the Court's narrow view of the  "right to make con-
tracts"  by arguing that  it "extends  only to the  formation of a contract,  but
not to problems that may arise later from the conditions of continuing  em-
ployment."33  At  the  same  time,  he  conceded  that  § 1981  would  grant  a
remedy  if an employer  "offer[ed]  to make a contract only on discriminato-
ry terms. "" This assumes  that what one gets from a contract is the  specific
terms  bargained  for.  More  importantly,  it assumes  that if a contract  does
not  include  discriminatory  terms,  then  actual discrimination  on  the  job
cannot  be  a violation  of the  contract terms.  This  means that if one  wants
equal  treatment,  one  must bargain for  specific contract terms  that prohibit
the  employer  from discriminatory  harassment  on the  job.  That,  in turn,
29.  427  U.S.  160  (1976).
30.  491  U.S.  164  (1989).
31.  Civil Rights Acts of 1991,  Pub.  L. No.  102-166,  105 Stat.  1071  (1991).
32.  Patterson, 491  U.S.  at 176.
33.  Id.
34.  Id. at 177.
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assumes  that if the contract is silent on the question that the employer must
have  reserved  the  right  to  treat  the  employee  differently  because  of the
employee's  race.
That  is  an  extraordinarily  odd  assumption  to  make.  One  could  easily
conclude that if the employer  wanted the  right to  treat workers  differently
because  of their race,  that the  employer  should include  the discriminatory
term in the contract.  Of course,  no employer would include  such  a term  in
the  contract  today,  and  that  is  exactly the  point.  The  Civil Rights  Act of
1866  prohibits  discriminatory  terms  in contracts.3  For that reason,  pros-
pective  employees  assume,  based  on  the  language  of  § 1981,  that their
contract  rights will be the  same as  those  of white citizens,  who  obviously
do not have to bargain  for special protection against racial  discrimination.
Why  make the  background  assumption be  that employers  are  free  to  dis-
criminate  on the basis  of race  absent  a federal  law  limiting their power to
do  so or a contract term promising  equal treatment on the job?
Justice  Kennedy  further  argued  that  it was  wrong  to  interpret  § 1981
broadly  because  a later  statute,  Title  VII  of the  Civil Rights  Act of 1964,
not only prohibited  racial discrimination  in employment but extended such
regulations  to  the  "terms  and  conditions"  of such employment.3 6  He fur-
ther argued  that Congress may have intended the  "mediation and  concilia-
tion  procedures"  of Title  VII  to  be  applicable  to  post-hiring  harassment
claims  while leaving  plaintiffs  free to  sue under  § 1981  for initial  refusal
to hire on equal terms.37  This  suggests that Congress,  in  1964,  intended to
limit the ability  to  sue under  § 1981.  While  it is  true that it was  not clear
in  1964  whether  § 1981  applied  to  private  conduct,  the  Supreme  Court
later determined  that the  statute  did apply  to  such conduct.  While  courts
sometimes  view later,  specific  statutes  as  impliedly limiting earlier,  broad-
er statutes,  the courts have generally eschewed that line of interpretation in
interpreting  the  civil rights  laws  of the  1960s.  For example,  although the
1964  Civil Rights  Act  exempts  small  employers,  the  Supreme  Court un-
animously  held  that  § 1981  applies  to  such  employers,  prohibiting  them
from engaging  in discriminatory  employment practices.38
More  importantly,  Congress  definitively  repudiated  the  Supreme
Court's  interpretation  of § 1981  in Patterson  by  enacting  the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.39  Overturning  a number  of Supreme  Court decisions that had
narrowly  interpreted  federal civil rights  acts,  Congress  affirmed,  not  only
that  § 1981  applies  to  private  conduct,  but that  it  extends  to  "the  enjoy-
ment  of all  benefits,  privileges,  terms,  and  conditions  of the  contractual
35.  42 U.S.C.  §  1981  (2010).
36.  42 U.S.C.  § 2000e-2(a)(1)  (2010).
37.  Patterson,  491 U.S.  at 182.
38.  See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,  Inc., 421  U.S.  454  (1975).
39.  Civil Rights Act of 1991,  Pub.  L. No.  102-166,  105  Stat.  1071  (1991).
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relationship."40  This  was  the  first time  the  Civil  Rights  Act of  1866  had
been  amended,  and  the  language  of the  1991  act  suggests  not  only  that
Congress wanted the  rights in the  statute to be  read broadly  but that Con-
gress  intended to redefine the  "right to contract"  to include  "all benefits...
of the contractual  relationship."
The only  way to  interpret this  new language  to exclude  discriminatory
harassment  while in a retail  store is to understand  an ongoing contract like
an employment relationship  to be fundamentally  different from  a transitory
purchase contract  typical of a retail  store.  Yet, there is no basis for such a
conclusion.  It is  true  that the  employment  contract  extends  over time  and
means  the parties have  duties to  each other  that extend over time.  Howev-
er,  a purchase  in  a  store  is  not something  that  happens  in an  instant.  To
buy a shirt, one must be allowed in the store; to find the shirt, one must be
free to browse and to  seek assistance.  One must,  in other  words,  feel wel-
come  not only  when  one is  deciding whether  to  enter the  store,  but when
one is engaged in the American pastime called  "shopping."
The Civil Rights Act of 1991  does list as one of its findings that "addi-
tional remedies.  . . are needed to deter unlawful harassment  and intention-
al  discrimination  in  the  workplace, "41  and  that  one  of its purposes  is  "to
provide  appropriate  remedies  for  intentional  discrimination  and  unlawful
harassment  in the workplace. "42  These purposes  are designed  to  show that
the  statute  is  intended to  overrule the Patterson decision.  But another  pur-
pose  stated  in the  1991  act is  "to  respond  to  recent decisions  of the  Su-
preme  Court by expanding  the  scope of relevant civil rights  statute  in or-
der  to  provide  adequate  protection  to  victims  of  discrimination."4  The
language  of the  revised  § 1981,  when  viewed  in  light  of the  latter  ex-
pressed purpose,  is sufficient to give  a strong basis for interpreting  § 1981
to  apply to  not only the moment one  seeks entrance  to  a  store and the mo-
ment  one  offers  to  buy  goods,  but  to  the  conduct  in between  those  mo-
ments  that is  a necessary  and customary  part of the process of purchasing
goods and services  in a non-discriminatory  fashion.
Congress does not want a narrow,  cramped  interpretation of the  "right
to  contract."  Rather,  it  intends  the  right  to  encompass  all aspects  of the
contractual  relationship.  For  retail  stores,  the  relationship  between  the
store and  patrons  does not begin and  end  at the moment a customer  steps
in front  of the  cashier.  Indeed,  the  courts  themselves  recognize  that  the
relationship  starts  when  the  customer  seeks  entrance  to  the  store.  Did
Congress intend  to  regulate  the  moment  of entrance  and  the  moment the
customer  offers  cash  for the  goods,  but to  leave  the  time  in between  an
40.  42 U.S.C.  § 1981(b)  (2010).
41.  Civil Rights Act of 1991,  Pub. L.  102-166,  §  2(1),  105  Stat.  1071,  1071  (1991).
42.  Id. at §  3(1).
43.  Id. at §  3(4).
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unregulated  war zone? It defies reason to believe that Congress intended to
prohibit  racially  discriminatory  harassment  on  the job  but  found  harass-
ment  of customers  in retail  stores  to  be  perfectly  fine.  Decisions  to  that
effect are likely  to lead to future legislation  closing the gap;  the reverse  is
unthinkable.  Court  decisions  prohibiting  discriminatory  harassment  of
customers  would never be  overruled by Congress.  This  alone  is  sufficient
to give us  a sense of how Congress would want the § 1981  language inter-
preted.
III.  DISCRIMINATORY  HARASSMENT  IN HOUSING
The Fair Housing Act of 1968  (FHA) makes  it unlawful  "  [t]o refuse to
sell  or  rent"  housing  because  of race;  to  "otherwise  make  unavailable  or
deny"  housing because of race;  and to  "discriminate  against any person in
the terms,  conditions,  or privileges  of sale or rental of a  dwelling."44  Sec-
tion  3617 of the FHA  makes  it  "unlawful  to coerce,  intimidate,  threaten,
or interfere  with any person in the exercise  or enjoyment of . ..  any right
granted  or  protected"  by  the  Act.45  Do  the  rights  granted  by the  Act  in-
clude the right to be free from harassment or intimidation by neighbors?
In Fowler v.  Borough of West,46  the  court held that fair housing  rights
were denied if the town government engaged in harassing activity designed
to  induce recovering  alcoholics  or drug users  to  move out of a residential
facility,  even if they did not in fact move  out. Such  activity  "make[s]  un-
available  or  den[ies]"  housing  even  if the  residents  choose  to  stay:4 7  "It
would  run contrary  to  the  remedial purposes  of the  statute to  hold  that a
defendant,  acting with the intent of denying  a handicapped person housing,
could avoid  liability  merely  because his efforts  were  unsuccessful."48  The
court  also  found  a potential  violation  of § 3617  because  of acts  intended
"to disrupt the exercise  or enjoyment of a protected right. "49
However,  the  Seventh  Circuit  initially  expressed  skepticism  toward
such  claims.  In Halprin v. Prairie  Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park
Ass'n,50  plaintiffs  claimed  not  that  they  were  prevented  from  acquiring
housing,  but  that both  their  neighbors  and  the  homeowners'  association
44.  42 U.S.C.  § 3604(a)-(b)  (2010).
45.  42 U.S.C.  §  3617 (2010).
46.  97 F.  Supp.  2d 602 (D.N.J.  2000).
47.  42 U.S.C.  § 3604(a).
48.  Fowler, 97 F.  Supp.  2d at  611.
49.  Id. at 613. Accord, Schroeder v. DeBertolo,  879  F.  Supp.  173,  175-77  (D.P.R.  1995) (post-
acquisition  harassment  of  a  condo unit  owner  by the  condominium  association's  board  of directors
because of her  disability violated her  "continuing  right to quiet enjoyment and use  of her condominium
unit"  and  thus  violated  both  §  3617  and  the  "otherwise  make unavailable  or deny"  provision  of §
3604);  Aric  Short,  Post-Acquisition Harassment and the Scope of the Fair  Housing Act,  58  ALA.  L.
REv. 203  (2006) (arguing  that the FHA regulates post-acquisition harassment).
50.  388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2004).
100
HeinOnline  -- 1 Ala. C.R. & C.L. L. Rev. 100 20112011]  The Anti-Apartheid  Principle in American  Property Law  101
itself  ganged  up  on  them  and  subjected  them  to  continuing  harassment
because  they  were  Jewish.  Those  acts  allegedly  included  writing  anti-
Semitic graffiti on their wall,  damaging their trees,  and destroying  minutes
of board  meetings at which  the president had threatened  "to  'make  an ex-
ample"'  of  them."  Judge  Posner  noted  that  the  statutory  language  in
§ 3617  only  covers  activities  such  as redlining  that prevent  people  from
acquiring  property  and  says  nothing  about  post-acquisition  harassment.5 2
He  distinguished  Title  VII of the  1964  Civil Rights  Act,  which  "protects
the  job  holder  as  well  as  the  job  applicant,"  but noted  that  "[t]he  Fair
Housing Act contains no hint either in its language or its legislative history
of a  concern  with  anything  but  access to  housing. "3  He  suggested  that
§ 3604 focuses  on the right to acquire housing  on equal terms and does not
identify post-acquisition  conduct  as  subject  to  legal  regulation.  The  court
held that such harassment  was  a violation  of § 3617 only because  a  HUD
regulation  interprets  § 3617  as  prohibiting  post-acquisition  conduct  that
interferes  with  the  "enjoyment  of a  dwelling. ""  The  court did  not reach
the  question  of  whether  the  regulation  was  a  valid  interpretation  of
§ 3617.
Similarly,  in Bloch v. Frischholz,5 6  plaintiffs  sought a religious excep-
tion to  a  condominium  rule that  prohibited  them from  placing  a mezuzah
on the  doorpost  of their  unit.  They  initially  lost in the  Seventh  Circuit.
Judge  Frank  Easterbrook  explained  that  the  Fair  Housing  Act  does  not
prohibit  post-acquisition  racial  or  religious  discrimination  against  condo-
minium  owners by the condominium  association,  since it only protects the
right  to acquire  property  on equal  terms.5
1  On rehearing  en banc,  the Se-
venth  Circuit  agreed  that  § 3604(a)'s  protections  of the  right  to  acquire
housing  do  not extend  to  post-acquisition  harassment:5 9  "Availability,  not
simply  habitability,  is  the  right  that  § 3604(a)  protects."60  The  court did
hold  that  denial  of the  right  to  post  a mezuzah  might  indeed  make  the
property  "unavailable"  but  also  held  that  the  Blochs  could  sustain  that
claim only if they moved out of the premises. 61  Judge Tinder explained that
51.  Id. at 328.
52.  Id. at 328-39.
53.  Id. at 329  (emphasis in original).  For a  similar ruling holding that the Fair  Housing  Act does
not  regulate  post-acquisition  harassment,  see  Cox  v.  City  of  Dallas,  430  F.3d  734,  745  (5th Cir.
2005).
54.  24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2010).
55.  388  F.3d at 330.
56.  533  F.3d 562 (7th Cir.  2008), rev'd, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009).
57.  In  response  to  this  decision,  both  the  City  of Chicago  and  the  State  of Illinois  passed  laws
guaranteeing  the  right to  place  religious  symbols  on the  door  or entrance  to  one's  home.  765  ILL.
COMP.  STAT.  605/18.4(h)  (2010); MUNICIPAL  CODE OF CHICAGO  §  5-8-030(h) (2010).
58.  533  F.3d at 563.
59.  587  F.3d at 776-78.
60.  587  F.3d at 777.
61.  The  court  makes this ruling  based on an analogy  with the  common  law doctrine  of construc-
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the  Blochs  "never  moved  out"  and  "give  no  reason  why  they  failed  to
vacate."6 2  Although the court  refused to conclude that  "a plaintiff must,  in
every  case,  vacate  the premises  to  have  a  § 3604  claim,"  it did conclude
that  "we  see  no possibility  that  a reasonable jury could  conclude  that the
defendants'  conduct  rendered  Shoreline  Towers  'unavailable'  to  the
Blochs,  which is what  § 3604(a) requires."63
As with the public  accommodations  laws,  the court grants a remedy to
someone who refuses to go through with the deal or who ends  the relation-
ship  but refuses  to  grant  a remedy  to  someone  who  insists  on  exercising
her rights to participate in the deal or remain  in the housing.  This  interpre-
tation  is  based  on  the  idea  that  the  statute  was  intended  only  to  allow
access  to  housing,  not to  allow non-discriminatory  treatment  once  one  is
there-precisely  the  assumption  in  Patterson that  was  overruled  in  the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.
On the  other  hand,  the  Seventh  Circuit did find  a claim rooted  in the
protections  in § 3604(b)  against discriminatory  terms  and conditions  in the
contractual  relationship.64  Just  as  tenants  have  continuing  relationships
with  landlords,  condominium  buyers  have  continuing  relationships  with
the  condominium  board.  Thus,  the  claim  that the  board  intentionally  dis-
criminated on the basis of religion when  it enforced  its rules  in a discrimi-
natory  manner  does  constitute  a possible  violation  of § 3604(b).
65  At the
same  time,  the  court  refused  to  overrule  the  language  of  Halprin that
found  it implausible  to  apply  § 3604(b)  to  conduct  by neighbors  who  are
not in a contractual relationship  with the tenant or owner.66
The  Seventh  Circuit also  reversed  the  ruling  of the three-judge  panel
that had held that § 3617  does  not prohibit post-acquisition  discriminatory
harassment of owners by neighbors or by a homeowners'  association.67  By
prohibiting  coercion,  intimidation,  threats,  and  interference  with  rights to
be  free  from  discrimination  guaranteed  by  the  FHA,  § 3617  extends  to
attempts to  get people  to leave  their  homes  even if they  do not choose to
move out.
68
Like  the  courts  interpreting  the public accommodation  laws  narrowly,
some  federal courts have approached  the Fair Housing Act with a cramped
and  narrow  interpretive  lens,  assuming  that  there  is  a  heavy  burden  of
persuasion on those who seek to  interpret the act to apply to discriminato-
tive eviction,  which traditionally cannot  be a defense  to a rent  claim unless  the tenant  actually vacates
the premises.  Id. at 777-78.  See also  JOSEPH WILLIAM  SINGER,  PROPERTY  § 10.6.1  (3d ed.  2010).
62.  587 F.3d at 778.
63.  Id.
64.  Id. at 779-781.
65.  Id. at 780.
66.  Id.
67.  Id. Accord, Comm.  Concerning  Cmty. Improvement v.  City of Modesto,  583  F.3d 690,  713-
715 (9th Cir. 2009).
68.  Bloch, 587 F.3d at 782-83
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ry harassment  that does not have  the effect of preventing  initial acquisition
of property or prompting  an owner  or tenant to  move out. The recent rul-
ing by the  Seventh Circuit en banc  in Bloch v.  Frischholz is  welcome be-
cause  it may help  to begin  redrawing  the balance  in  a manner that recog-
nizes  Congress's  intent to protect  everyone from discriminatory  treatment
at all  stages  of the  process  of participation  in the public  accommodations
and housing  markets.  But that will only  happen if we rethink  the relation-
ship  between  law  and  society  and  between  the  concepts  of  regulation,
property,  and freedom  of contract.
IV.  PROPERTY IN A  FREE AND  DEMOCRATIC  SOCIETY
It  is  surprising  that the  federal  courts  have been  interpreting  federal
statutes  to  deny protection  from racially  discriminatory  treatment  in both
public  accommodations  and housing.  After all,  it has been more than forty
years  since the major Civil Rights Acts were passed in 1964  and  1968,  and
one might have thought that these  laws,  combined  with modern interpreta-
tion  of  the  Civil  Rights  Acts  passed  immediately  after  the  Civil  War,
would  have guaranteed  comprehensive  protection from  affirmative  discri-
minatory  treatment  in  the  marketplace.  We  are  addressing  old-fashioned
intentional  discrimination  against  persons  because  of their  race,  not  con-
troversial  questions  of affirmative  action (treating people  "better"  because
of their  race) or  disparate  impact  (finding  facially  neutral  rules  to have  a
discriminatory  effect on protected  groups).  In case after case,  we  find fed-
eral judges  empowering  retail  stores  to  engage  in  offensive,  racially  dis-
criminatory  treatment  of customers,  and we  find reluctance  on the part of
some federal judges to protect homeowners  and tenants from discriminato-
ry  conduct designed  to  deny them  quiet enjoyment  of their  homes.  What
accounts for this?
One answer is that the judges are reading federal civil rights statutes  in
a  stingy  manner.  They  are  presuming  that individuals  are  free from gov-
ernment  regulation  unless  those regulations,  by express  and unmistakably
clear  language,  limit  their  freedom.  That  leads judges  to  interpret  "the
right to make contracts"  in a manner that encompasses  the formation stage
of the  contractual  relationship  but not  what  happens  after  the  contract  is
formed.  It  also  leads  judges  to  interpret  rights  to  rent  or  buy  on  equal
terms  as  not  encompassing  conduct  that  interferes  with  quiet  enjoyment
after  one  becomes  an  owner.  It leads  judges  to  interpret  rights  to  have
housing  not made  "unavailable"  to  apply only if one actually  leaves  one's
home.
This  attitude  to  statutory  language may  be  thought  by some  to  be ad-
mirable  care for the textual  sources of law,  based on the notions that Con-
gress  has  a duty to be  clear about what it is  prohibiting  and that,  in  a free
society,  anything  that  is  not  prohibited  is  allowed.  This  is  all  well  and
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good,  but  it ignores  a more traditional  method  of reading  civil  rights law
based on the canon of interpretation that remedial statutes  should be broad-
ly  construed  to  effectuate  their  purposes.  Statutes  designed  to  grant  full
rights to  contract and  acquire property on the  same basis as  is enjoyed  by
white citizens,  i.e.,  those who do not experience discrimination or unequal
treatment  because  of their  race,  might just  as  easily  be  interpreted  to  en-
compass  the  full  range  of rights  enjoyed  by  the  more  privileged  social
group.
If statutes  are  ambiguous,  the traditional  "remedial  statutes"  canon of
construction allows for interpretation  in line with the values underlying the
statutes-values  that change  over  time.  It  is  commonplace  that  "separate
but equal"  was  once thought to be compatible  with equal protection of the
law  but  that  this  interpretation  changed  over  time.  Women  were  denied
equal  rights  at the  time  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  adopted  and  the
Civil  Rights  Act  of  1866  was  passed,  but no  one  today  thinks  that the
equal  protection  clause  does  not  prohibit  discrimination  on  the  basis  of
sex.  Civil  rights  statutes  similarly  are  written  with  broad  language  de-
signed to  extend to  all persons'  rights to participate  in economic  life with-
out disadvantage  because  of race.  They  too  should be  interpreted  in light
of  evolving  values,  especially  in  light  of changing  conceptions  of  what
equality demands.
Later statutes  may clarify what is meant by equal rights to contract and
acquire  property.  The  Civil  Rights  Acts  of the  1960s  require  "full  and
equal enjoyment"  of places of public accommodation  and nondiscriminato-
ry  "terms  and  conditions"  of housing  and  employment.  If the  rights  to
contract  and purchase property are ambiguous,  judges should look to con-
temporary  values  embedded  in  similar  statutes  to  determine  what  those
concepts  mean.  Instead,  some  courts  have  decided that the textual  guaran-
tee of "full  and  equal enjoyment"  of a  place of public  accommodation  in
the  1964  Civil Rights  Act shows that Congress intended  not to grant such
protection in  1866.69  But the  1866 Act says nothing of the kind. It not only
does not state  that unequal treatment  is  allowed but guarantees  all  persons
the same right to  contract as  is enjoyed by white  citizens.  The contempo-
rary  view  of what that entails  should  be  the  baseline  for  interpreting  the
broad rights guaranteed  by  §§  1981  and  1982.
More  fundamentally,  the  narrow  view  presumes  that  Congress  cared
about  requiring  formally  equal  contract  terms  but  cared  nothing  about
substantively  equal  treatment  in the  contracting  process  or in  the  enjoy-
ment  of rights  obtained  by  contract.  But this  is  a bizarre  conception  of
what equality demands.  One might concede that racial  segregation in pub-
lic accommodations  and housing may have been the norm in  1866,  but the
69.  Patterson,  491 U.S.  164.
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idea that equality  today requires  only formally  equal  terms while allowing
substantively  unequal  enjoyment of rights gained  by contract  does  not ac-
cord with any sensible current interpretation of what the concept of equali-
ty requires.
Nor is there  anything  amiss  with reading  ambiguous terms  like  "right
to  contract"  in light  of contemporary  norms  embodied  in  similar  statutes
and in common law.  If that were so,  then Plessy v.  Ferguson"o should nev-
er have been overruled.  The purpose of interpreting  a statute is to do what
Congress  wants,  and  if Congress  is  deliberately  vague  about  that,  then
democracy  is  promoted  rather  than  undermined  by  deferring  to  current
values,  as  embodied  in other  statutes  and  common  law  principles,  rather
than the will of the legislature  that passed  the law  150 years  ago.  In over-
turning the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson,  Congress demonstrated
its intent to  prohibit discriminatory  treatment  in market relationships,  not
merely  discriminatory  contract  terms.  That  principle,  not  the  views  of
Congress  in  1866,  should  govern  current  interpretations  of  the  Civil
Rights  Act of  1866.  A  ruling that retail  stores  cannot discriminate  on the
basis of race in their treatment of customers  will not be  overruled by Con-
gress;  the  opposing  ruling  very  well  may  be.  In  a  democracy  that vests
lawmaking  power  in the  legislature,  it  promotes  democracy  rather  than
undermines  it to  interpret the  "right to  contract"  in light of contemporary
values  embedded in statutes  governing civil rights.
This  brings  me  to  my  final  and  most  important  point.  The  federal
courts  are interpreting  civil rights laws  in the light of a  flawed conception
of the  relations between  law  and society  and between  freedom and  equali-
ty.  They  are  presuming  that the  baseline  is  negative  liberty,  or  freedom
from restrictions on one's actions,  and that all government regulations take
our liberty  away.  In particular,  they are  assuming  that laws  that promote
equality can  only be  enforced  at the expense of liberty.  But these assump-
tions are false.
It is  commonplace  that there  is no liberty without  law.  The liberty  we
care  about  is  not  unrestricted  freedom;  that would  be  anarchy.  It would
be,  as  Thomas  Hobbes  vividly  described  it,  a  "war  of all against  all."7
There  are  places  in the  world  that have  little  government  and  little  law,
and  most  Americans  would  not  want  to  live  there.  They  are  war  zones
governed  by chaos,  or they are in  the thrall of warlords.  There are  places
that  do not effectively  enforce criminal  law preventing  people from harm-
ing each  other.  In  such places,  one  is  not free to  walk the  streets  because
of fear  of being  killed.  Law  and  liberty  are  not  opposites.  It is  true  that
laws  often  limit  what  we  can  do  and  in  this  sense  limit the  liberty  we
70.  163  U.S.  537 (1896).
71.  THOMAS  HOBBES,  DE  CIVE  13  (Sterling  P.  Lamprecht  ed.,  Appleton-Century-Crofts  1949)
(1651).
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would  have  in  the  "state  of nature."  But  that  does  not mean  they  are  in-
fringements  on our  freedom;  indeed,  they  are what makes us free.  Civil
rights  statutes  do prohibit discrimination  on the  basis of race,  but it does
not follow that they deny liberty; indeed,  the very opposite  is true.
The  courts  are  presuming  that  we  read  statutes  against  a  background
of absolute freedom of action.  The  "free  market"  in this  view  is  a realm
where  people  have  no  duties to  each  other beyond  those they voluntarily
assume.  Of course,  there are background rules against murder  and battery;
assaulting your competitor is not within the realm of free and fair competi-
tion.  You  are  also  not  allowed  to  invade,  harm,  or take your  neighbors'
property  without their consent. But beyond that,  we have  no duties to oth-
ers.  We  are  free to  contract  on  whatever  terms  we  like,  and  we  are  free
not  to  contract  if we  do  not feel  like  it.  We  are  free  to  deny  others  en-
trance  to  our  property,  whether  the  property  in  question  is  a  home  or a
place of employment,  or a retail  store.  This view assumes  that any  and all
contractual  relationships  are  tolerated  in  a  "free  market."  But  nothing
could be further from the truth.
The United  States  Constitution prohibits  Congress from granting  titles
of nobility.72  This not only prevents differentiation of class based on super-
ficial things  like being called  Lord or Duke,  but it  also prevents  the con-
ferral of unequal  status.  Its counterpart in state  statutes  and common law  is
the  abolition  of  feudalism.  This  is  not  merely  a  hypothetical  problem.
Feudal  property  relations  were  indeed  established  originally  in  states  like
New  York and New  Jersey.  The advent of the  Constitution and the  devel-
opment of state  property law  following  1789  saw  case  law  that expressly
abolished the fee tail and other  forms of property that were associated  with
feudalism.
73  This  means  that  we  are  not  free  to  create  enforceable  con-
tracts  that  establish  relationships  that  resemble  feudalism.  It  means  that
tenants  cannot be  "tied  to  the  land"  but must be  free  to  move.  It means
that  landowners  cannot  have  permanent  and  inheritable  obligations  to  a
distant "lord"  or his family.  It means  that land can generally be  sold rather
kept forever within a particular  family.  It means that we  do not have deb-
tor's prisons in the United  States or workhouses  in the absence of criminal
conduct.
The  Thirteenth  Amendment  abolished  slavery,  and  the  Civil  Rights
Act of 1866  guarantees rights to participate in economic  life without being
subject  to  contracts  that  differ  from slavery  in name  only.74  The  Married
Women's Property  Acts of the late  nineteenth  century  guaranteed  married
women  equal  rights  to  contract  and  to  own property.75  The Civil  Rights
72.  U.S.  CONST.  art. I, § 9, cl.  8.
73.  See,  e.g, DePeyster  v. Michael,  6  N.Y. 467 (1852).
74.  U.S.  CONST.  amend.  XIII,  § 1.
75.  The  Married  Women's  Property  Acts  were  enacted  by  states  throughout the  eighteenth and
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Acts  of the  1960s  guaranteed  rights  to  public  accommodations,  housing,
and  employment  without  regard  to  race  or  sex  or  religion.
76  The Ameri-
cans  with  Disabilities  Act  of  1990  extended  those  rights  to  persons  with
disabilities.
Civil rights  statutes  are  not  intrusive  interferences  with  liberty.  They
are what make  us a free and democratic society.  Without  them,  people
could be  free to  make  whatever contracts  they  like.  But private  contracts,
no less  than public  laws,  can  create relationships  that are  foreign  to those
that are  acceptable  in  a democracy.  Our  constitutions,  statutes,  and  com-
mon law protect our democracy  from devolving into  a racial  caste society,
feudal  society,  or  a patriarchy.  This  protection  comes  from  setting  mini-
mum standards  for economic relationships  compatible  with the norms of a
free  and  democratic  society  that treats  every  person  with  equal  concern
and respect. Beyond that,  we have consumer protection statutes  at both the
federal  and  state  levels  that comprehensively  regulate  market relations  to
ensure  that contracts  accord  with  minimum  standards  of decency.  Those
standards  ensure  that products  and  workplaces  and  houses  are  safe,  and
they  perform  as  expected.  Laws  set  minimum  standards  for  market rela-
tionships;  they define things that  we would  like to take for granted.7
'  They
are not unwelcome limitations on our natural  liberty.  They are what makes
us equally  free to  enjoy our liberties;  they are what defines  our society as
a free and democratic  society.
Libertarians believe  in law.  Yet,  their  focus on freedom  from govern-
ment interference  sometimes  leads them to forget their  own commitments.
Immediately  after winning the Republican primary for Senate in Kentucky,
Rand  Paul  admitted  that his libertarian  philosophy  made  him skeptical  of
the  1964 public accommodations  law that requires  restaurants and hotels to
serve  people  regardless  of their  race.
79  He worried  that such  a  law  inter-
fered with the right of property  owners and  forced them to enter contracts
against their will."
Rand  Paul was  soon  forced to back down,  mostly because  supporting
the  repeal  of civil  rights  laws  is  political  suicide  in 2010.  But  he  should
have  repudiated  his  view for  another,  more  fundamental reason.  The  val-
ues  that  libertarians  cherish  cannot  exist  in  a  society  without  law.  One
nineteenth  centuries.  The  New York  statute initially  enacted in  1848  served  as  the  model  for the  sta-
tutes  of many  other  states.  N.  Y.  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  LAW  § 50  (McKinney  1999)  (which  was
revised from the  1848  statute).
76.  Civil Rights  Act of 1964,  42 U.S.C.  § 2000a  (2010).  Fair Housing  Act,  42 U.S.C.  §§  3601-
3619, 3631  (2010).
77.  42 U.S.C.  §§  12101-12117 (2010).
78.  Joseph  William Singer,  Things that We  Would Like to  Take for Granted:  Minimum Standards
for the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic  Society, 2  HARV.  L. & POL'Y REv.  139  (2008).
79.  Jeff Jacoby,  Tough Stand: Freedom to Be Odious, BOSTON  GLOBE, May 25,  2010,  at  15.
80.  Adam Nagourney & Carl  Hulse,  Tea Party Pick Causes Uproar  on Civil Rights, N.  Y. TIMES,
May  20,  2010, at Al.
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cannot  travel  if one  is  excluded  from hotels  and  restaurants.  One  cannot
acquire property if stores will not let you in.  One cannot become  a home-
owner if no one will sell to you.  One is not free unless property ownership
is  widespread and  access to the market system is not closed to you because
of your race or ancestry or sex.
One might think that laws prohibiting  racial discrimination in retail es-
tablishments  are not needed  in the twenty-first century.  If so,  repealing the
1964 public  accommodations  law  would have  no impact. As Boston Globe
columnist Jeff Jacoby argued:
What  is  the  justification  for  laws banning  private  discrimination
today, when  Jim Crow  is  dead,  racism  is  overwhelmingly  abomi-
nated,  and  a black  man is  president  of the  United  States?  If a bi-
goted  store  owner  today  wants  to  refuse  service  to  blacks,  why
should he be barred by law from doing so?"
Rachel Maddow  noted  that,  without such  a  law,  segregation could re-
emerge."  Jacoby  opines  that  this  is  not  possible  today:  "A  firm  that
adopted  a  'No  Blacks'  policy would  set off a storm of public outrage;  if it
didn't back down,  it would be driven out of business within a week. "83
There  are two problems with Jacoby's reasoning.  First, even if a  store
could  not  adopt  a  formal  policy  of racial  exclusion  today,  that  does  not
mean that it cannot engage  in more subtle  forms of discrimination.  In fact,
many stores engage  in higher levels of surveillance of black customers and
disrespectful  treatment  is  not  uncommon.  Dozens  of federal  court  cases
give evidence of such treatment,  and federal law  does not go far enough in
protecting  customers  from  such conduct.  In  2003,  for example,  the Fifth
Circuit  Court of Appeals  found  no  violation of federal  law  when  a clerk
shouted  obscenities  and  made  racially  derogatory  remarks  directed  at  a
Latina customer after she completed her purchase at a gas station.84
Second,  and  more  importantly,  Jacoby  misses the  point.  Segregation
and  exclusion  on  the  basis  of race  are  outside  the  bounds  of acceptable
conduct  by owners  and  operators of public  accommodations  in a  free and
democratic  society.  Store owners  are obviously not allowed to assault their
customers  or detain them without  reason. And in the  twenty-first century,
they are also  not allowed to treat customers differently  because of race.  It
is  simply unacceptable under our current settled convictions about the con-
tours of economic relationships  in a free and  democratic  society for public
accommodations  to  deny  service  on the  grounds  of race.  Whether  this  is
81.  Jacoby,  supra note 79 (emphasis  in original).
82.  Id.
83.  Id.
84.  Arguello v.  Conoco, Inc.,  330 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003).
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accomplished through  voluntary  acceptance  of custom  or law  is beside the
point.  The  law  would  not be  necessary  if adherence  to  the  custom  were
universal.  Law becomes necessary  when such adherence is not universal.
Jacoby  wants  to  have his  cake  and  eat it too.  He wants  to  voice  sup-
port  for the practice of allowing  entrance to  stores  without regard  to  race
while adhering  to a libertarian philosophy  of banning regulation  of private
property.  One cannot have  it both ways.  Either we have  the right to enter
stores  without regard  to  race  or we  do not.  If we  have  such  a right,  then
the  rights  of private  property  owners  to  exclude  patrons  on  the  basis  of
race  must be  limited.  It is  no answer that economic competition  may drive
a particular  business  into bankruptcy;  our  settled consensus  is  that such a
business has  no right to exclude  patrons  on the basis of race  in the place.
A  law  banning such racial exclusion is  not a deprivation of liberty  or free
choice;  it ensures  that choice is  available.  The interest in accessing  a  store
without  regard  to  one's  race  is a  legitimate  one;  the  interest  in excluding
patrons  from one's  store on the basis of race  is  not a  legitimate one.  You
may  be  free  to  choose your  friends  on the  basis  of race,  but you  cannot
choose  your customers  on this basis-at least if you  want to  live in a free
and democratic society that eschews racial caste.
In the  year 2010,  it should finally be accepted  that invidious discrimi-
nation  in  the  marketplace  violates  the  public  policy  of both  the  United
States and the several  states.  People  are legally free to choose their friends
on any basis they  like. But Congress  has made clear that employers cannot
treat  employees  differently  based on their  race.  Congress  has  made  clear
that businesses  cannot  choose their  customers  based on race.  It should  be
abundantly  evident  that the  basic  policy  of United  States  law  is  to  grant
equal  access  to the  marketplace  without  regard  to  race.  This  includes  the
right to  "full and equal enjoyment"  of all the privileges offered  to the pub-
lic  in  public  accommodations  and  housing  as  well  as  employment.  We
have  abolished  "separate  but equal" policies  that grant a particular form of
service  to  white persons  and  another  to  African  Americans.  Owners  and
tenants  are  not able  to enjoy  their  property  if they are  not free  from  dis-
criminatory  harassment by neighbors because of race or religion.
American  law  now  contains  a  fundamental  background  principle  of
equality  in the  rules  governing  the  marketplace.  Congress  has  made  this
clear.  The common law  has  always  regulated private  relationships  to pre-
vent  the  re-emergence  of feudalism.  Our  current understanding  of racial
equality means that the common law  not only prohibits fees tail and feudal
rents  but  also  unequal  treatment  on the basis  of race  in the  enjoyment  of
things that are for sale.
Our legal baseline for public accommodations  and housing is not liber-
ty  to  discriminate  on the  basis  of race;  our  legal baseline  rejects  market
relations  premised on unequal  status.  We  reject feudalism.  We  reject  sla-
very.  And we reject apartheid.
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If this  is  so,  then the  courts  should be  reading  civil  rights  laws  with
those premises  in mind.  They  should be  assuming  that the  "right to make
contracts"  and  to  "purchase  personal  and real property"  includes  rights to
equal  terms  and  conditions  and  enjoyment  without  regard  to  race.  They
should be assuming  that these rights apply to the entire contracting  process
and  the process  of enjoying  goods  and  services  one  has  purchased.  Any
claim that one is free to treat African  Americans worse than white persons
in stores or homes should be met with skepticism bordering  on incredulity.
Courts  should  reject  such  interpretations  unless  statutes  affirmatively  and
unambiguously  grant the  right  to  discriminate  on the  basis  of race.  Con-
gress  has  not done this  and  it never  will.  Such  conduct  is unlawful;  it vi-
olates the basic  norms governing  market relationships  in a free and  demo-
cratic society.  It is time we understood this.
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